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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TEN MONTHS OF UNCERTAINTY
Problems concerning the nature of the title, if any, received by the
surviving spouse during the ten-month period following upon the issuance
of letters of administration of the deceased spouse's estate, and also whether
that title is transferable, occupied the attention of the Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of Bruce v. McCormnick.1 The decision therein, while
eminently sound under the present state of the law, prompts some inquiry
as to whether or not the law might not well be changed by legislative
revision of the present Probate Act.
According to the facts in that case, Samuel Wood died intestate own-
ing certain Illinois real estate and leaving a widow and several descend-
ants surviving him. Letters of administration were issued on his estate
on March 12, 1943. In April of that year, the widow and two of the
descendants conveyed their respective interests in the realty to the plain-
tiff by quit-claim deed. The following month, the widow released her
interest in the land to the remaining descendants. After all claim to
dower rights had been barred by lapse of time, the widow executed a
warranty deed to the plaintiff who thereafter filed a partition action al-
leging that he had acquired title to the widow's undivided one-third
interest by reason of her deeds to him. The trial court so found and
decreed partition in the plaintiff's favor. Upon direct appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court, it was held that the decree should be reversed.
The precise issues involved in the case were (1) is the barring of the
dower right still a condition precedent to the vesting of an interest in the
fee in the surviving spouse, and (2) can the dower interest be effectively
released before being barred by lapse of time and, if so, to whom. In-
timately connected with such issues, of course, was the further question
as to whether or not the present Probate Act had wrought any change
in the law which heretofore controlled on such questions.
Dower rights today are frequently regulated and modified by statute
so they are seldom the same in any two jurisdictions.2 In Illinois, certainly,
while dower is still based on common-law doctrines it has been enlarged and
modified by statute3 so that a surviving spouse has an alternative of claim-
ing either the common-law dower, preferred over the claims of creditors,
or else may take an interest in the fee after all debts have been dis-
1396 Ill. 482, 72 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947).
2 See 17 Am. Jur., Dower, § 7.
3 In general, see James, Illinois Probate Act Annotated (The Foundation Press,
Inc., Chicago, 1940), pp. 12 and 29.
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charged. The two potential interests are so co-mingled that an accurate
analysis of one is impossible without fully considering the effect of the
other.
Prior to the enactment of the present statute, Section 1 of the former
Descent Act' provided that the surviving spouse should receive as his or
her absolute estate, in lieu of dower, one-third of each parcel in which
such surviving spouse should waive his or her right of dower. The present
statutory provision, Section 11 of the Probate Act,' directs that the sur-
viving spouse shall receive one-third of each parcel in which the sur-
viving spouse does not perfect his or her right to dower pursuant to the
statutory manner so provided.6 The other heirs, therefore, receive the
remaining two-thirds of each parcel in which the surviving spouse does
not perfect his or her right to dower and, subject to the dower of the
surviving spouse, all of each parcel in which dower is perfected. Section
1 of the former Dower Act7 had likewise provided that the surviving
spouse should be endowed of a third part of the lands unless dower should
have been relinquished in legal form. The idea there expressed has been
carried over into a corresponding section of the Probate Act which states
that the surviving spouse is endowed of a third part of all real estate
unless dower has been released or is barred.8 Another section thereof
declares that dower is barred unless written intention to take dower is
filed within ten months after issuance of letters of administration and
within the lifetime of the surviving spouse.' These statutory changes
produced by the present Probate Act evoked the issues presented in the
instant case.
In order to decide that the same devolution of real estate resulted
under the Probate Act as was formerly the case, the court was obliged
to construe the varied sections of the statute together in order to garner
the legislative intent.10 A comparison of Section 1 of the Descent Act
with Section 11 of the Probate Act makes it evident that the same principle
underlies both sections albeit the idea is expressed in different terms.
Formerly, the surviving spouse received an absolute estate upon waiving
dower rights. Now the fee is received by not perfecting dower. Lapse of
time and inaction by the surviving spouse is regarded as being as effec-
4 111. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 39, § 1.
5 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 162.
a Ibid., Ch. 3, § 170.
7 Iil. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 41, § 1.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 170.
o Ibid., Ch. 3, § 171.
lo Classen v. Heath, 389 11. 183, 58 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945) ; Schoellkopf v. DeVry,
366 I1. 39, 7 N. E. (2d) 757, 110 A. L. R. 511 (1937) ; Sisk v. Smith, 6 Ill. 503
(1844). See also James, op. cit., p. 14.
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tive for purpose of waiving dower as it is in not perfecting dower. The
same result, therefore, is obtained in either case despite the different
language used.
In holding that the Probate Act had not changed the prior law,
special emphasis was placed by the court on the word "the" found in the
clause "unless the dower has been released or barred" to be found in
Section 18 of the Probate Act.1 It was held to relate to the right of
dower previously given and not to indicate that dower was to come into
being by election after a fee interest had vested in the surviving spouse.
Again, the close similarity in language between the former and the present
statute, except for a slight change in terms from "relinquished" to "re-
leased" or "barred," certainly fails to disclose any legislative purpose
to change the rules.
It may be deduced, therefore, that now, as before, the surviving
spouse's incohoate dower becomes dower consummate on the death of the
spouse owning the land, but that the fee to the real estate descends to
the heirs subject to the surviving spouse's alternative right to claim dower
or to receive a third of the fee. 12 The surviving spouse's right to perfect
dower is a right resting in action only. That action is limited to
perfecting dower, releasing the dower right, or allowing dower to be
barred by lapse of time. In the last mentioned case, the fee vests in
the survivor at the moment the right to perfect dower becomes barred.13
Until then, the heirs hold the full fee title encumbered by the surviving
spouse's right of dower. When the dower is barred, the several interests
of the respective heirs automatically become reduced proportionately
in order to give the statutory dower substitute of an undivided one-third
in fee to the surviving spouse. 14
In the light of these principles, it seems clear that the widow in the
instant case did not have any estate to convey to the plaintiff during the
ten-month period following the issuance of letters of administration and
while she held only an unassigned dower right. What then was the effect
of her release to some of the heirs? It is established law in this state that
unassigned dower is not such an estate that can be conveyed by deed to
11 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 170. Italics added.
12 Braidwood v. Charles, 327 Ill. 500, 159 N. E. 38 (1927) ; Steinhagen v. Trull,
320 Ill. 382, 151 N. E. 250 (1926) ; Kryczka v. Brzozowski, 328 Il. App. 220, 65 N. E.
(2d) 619 (1946) ; Wilson v. Hilligoss, 278 Ill. App. 564 (1935).
13 Liesman v. Liesman, 331 Iil. 287, 162 N. E. 855 (1928) ; Maring v. Meeker, 263
Ill. 136, 105 N. E. 31 (1914); Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 Ill. 270, 43 N. E. 1111(1896) ; Anderson v. Smith, 159 Ill. 93, 42 N. E. 306 (1895) ; Hart v. Burch, 130 Ill.
426, 22 N. E. 831, 6 L. R. A. 371 (1889); Best v. Jenks, 123 Ill. 447, 15 N. E. 173(1888) ; Hoots v. Graham, 23 Ill. 79 (1859) ; Summers v. Babb, 13 Ill. 483 (1853).
14 Ruwaldt v. McBride, Inc., 388 Ill. 285, 57 N. E. (2d) 863, 155 A. L. R. 1209
(1944).
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a stranger, although it may be released to the owner of the fee. This rule
was succinctly stated in the case of Best v. Jenks5 where the court said:
"It [dower] may be released so as to bar the right of asserting it against
the owner of the fce, but it cannot be invested in another separately from
the fee." 16  The determination therein has been followed with approval
many times, 17 so it was proper to hold, in the instant case, that the quit-
claim deed by the widow to some of the heirs was sufficient to release her
right of dower but only to the extent of removing the incumberance thereof
from the interests held by those named as grantees in that deed."8 She
did not release her right of dower in the shares of the estate held by the
descendants who were not named in that deed, nor did she effectively
transfer the same to the plaintiff for he was then a stranger to the fee.
Since that deed was only a quit-claim instrument it could not operate to
divest her of an after-acquired title.'9 When that dower was eventually
barred by lapse of time, the widow received a one-third in fee of the un-
divided estate held by the descendants who were not named in the release
and this was the only interest she had to convey to the plaintiff by her
subsequent warranty deed. The decision in the instant case, then, clears
the air of any doubts which may have existed that the present Probate Act
had been designed to change the prior law. The basic law, rules, and
doctrines remain unchanged and the new statute merely restates, codifies
and consolidates the earlier statutes on this point.
20
The court, of course, determined no problems in the instant case other
than the ones before it. A discussion of this sort, however, would not
be complete without considering some of the possibilities which could
arise. Suppose, for example, the facts were slightly changed and the
quitclaim deed to plaintiff had been executed after he had received
deeds from some of the heirs. It could be argued, following the decision
therein, that plaintiff then held a sufficient fee interest in the land to
give legal effectiveness to the widow's release of her unassigned dower
right to him, but only as it related to the proportion of the estate held
15123 Ill. 447, 15 N. E. 173 (1888).
16 123 Ill. 447 at 456, 15 N. E. 173 at 178.
17 Maring v. Meeker, 263 Ill. 136, 105 N. E. 31 (1914) ; Fletcher v. Shepherd, 174
Ill. 262, 51 N. E. 212 (1898) ; Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 111. 270, 43 N. E. 1111 (1896) ;
Anderson v. Smith, 159 Il. 93, 42 N. El. 306 (1895) ; Heisen v. Heisen, 145 Ill. 658,
34 N. E. 597 (1893).
is Fletcher v. Shepherd, 174 Il1. 262, 51 N. E. 212 (1898) ; Hart v. Burch, 130 Ill.
426, 22 N. E. 831 (1889).
19 O'Malley v. Deany, 384 Ill. 484, 51 N. E. (2d) 583 (1943) : Thornton v. Louch,
297 II. 204, 130 N. E. 467 (1921) ; DuBois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340, 126 N. E. 104 (1920).
20 Any other interpretation would have been in direct conflict with the views ex-
pressed by the framers of the statute: James, op. cit.. p. 14. See also Fins,
"Analysis of the Illinois Probate Code," 34 Ill. L. Rev. 405 (1940) at 411.
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by him. In the event that the situation were the same as in the instant
case except that the widow had originally given a warranty deed instead
of a quitclaim, the same decision as in the instant case should result. The
theory then to be employed would be that after release given to the heirs
the widow would never receive an interest in the fee which could inure to
the plaintiff as after-acquired title unless she subsequently received a
reconveyance from the heirs. On the other hand, if no release was given
and no action taken to claim dower, a warranty deed given in the ten-
month period should vest the grantee with a one-third interest in the fee
when acquired by the surviving spouse, and would probably be similarly
effective as to the dower interest if action should be taken by the spouse
to claim the same.21 It is obvious, however, that despite these possibilities
there would be a period of time during which the eventual ownership of
the property would be a matter of doubt and uncertainty.
As stability, alienability, and certainty of titles to real estate is
desirable, and the foregoing discussion indicates the existence of several
doubtful contingencies, the legislature might well consider the wisdom of
amending the Probate Act so as to vest a fee title in the surviving spouse
immediately upon death of the owner just as the common law provided
should be the case with respect to the heir. In that way, a conveyance
at any time by the surviving spouse would serve to pass an immediate
interest to the grantee. The statute might then well direct that any such
conveyance made before election to take dower should just as effectively
bar the right to perfect dower as would a release to the heirs. If reten-
tion of common-law dower as an elective interest is desirable, and there
are times when it might be, the statute could indicate that the surviving
spouse should take the statutory share in the form of a vested fee subject
to be defeated by a positive election to take the common-law interest
within a limited time and before any conveyance. The requirement of
a positive act of election would be no more onerous that the present statute
while the uncertainty as to the eventual outcome of the title, forced by the
present state of the law during the ten-month waiting period, could readily
be avoided. Cerainly, if this were the law, the surviving spouse would
be able to find a wider market and, probably, a better price for the
estate thereby vested than is presently the case.
L. C. TRAEER
21 See Thornton v. Louch, 297 Ill. 204, 130 N. E. 467 (1921), to the effect that a
deed reciting that grantor was seized or possessed of the land conveyed would estop
the grantor from denying the grantee's right to an after-acquired title. See also
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 30, § 6.
